China Girds for submarine battles in the South China Sea
Beijing is building a new aircraft unit that will be of major importance in the new southern fortress. There, the great journalist was paying attention to some new brilliant Chinese military games such as the DF-26 anti-ship missile model (A.S.B.M), a fighter program that the J-20 so much discussed, not to mention the aircraft carriers of the Beijing program.
Recently the People’s Liberation Army (P.L.A) Guard community is full of the reputation that China will soon launch intruders. These are all legitimate topics for discussion, but we should not ignore the less charming items in the Beijing instrument that can have a major impact on the strategic balance.
The sea region is the main factor in the emerging rivalry between the
United States and China in the Western Pacific. Over the years, the
Dragon Eye columns have investigated the eye of the mine tray freely,
small frigates (type 056), planes and anti-submarine helicopters (A.S.W)
and rocket torpedoes, large amphibian planes and unmanned undersea
surface (U.U.Vs) and submarines.
So if American strategists were to take note when the reports on the creation of a new unit of operations free of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, the first military aircraft flying long-range naval patrols to maintain China’s Sea Progress (MPA) improved to resist the submarine war. they activated it, and the device comprises several GX-6 [高新 六号] ASW aircraft in the southern seas of the fleet during the spring of 2018.
Chinese naval analysts recognize the weakness of the PLA in the assembly and openly describe it as a “short board” of the Chinese “barrel”. The other Chinese platforms, ASW’s subsidiary, such as SH-5 or Z-9, said to be a helicopter with limited capacities, such as “the Chinese Navy was in dire need to provide them with a large ASW aircraft model with a solid wing” [中国海军 迫切 需要 装置 型 型 型 固定翼 反潜 飞机]. Given that the benefits of these aircraft, including speed and scope, a huge load, coupled with the fact that submarines are in trouble at the head of these aircraft, calls for this analysis to identify America’s air patrol aircraft as an “enemy” [天敌] submarine.
The analysis shows that the GX-6 powered by a new engine type that includes fans designed to increase efficiency. They set the operating range to 5000 kilometers.
The clear and unique feature
of this airplane is the great visibility that installed on the chin
under the cabin they describe which as a 360-degree radar search angle
designed to detect diving poles, binoculars or beacons. Its detection
capability is superior to the US P3C A.S.W. This analysis states that the
size of the crew can exceed ten people.
It is said the GX-6 bears the burden of 100 sonorous. They use these to set targets. According to the Chinese analysis, the magnetometer [磁 探 仪 يكشف] can detect submarines with a depth of 900 or even 1000 meters. Whether it’s true or just a joke, looking at the image or drawing of the plane means that the magnetometer is a key part of the design.
This article also states that ASW helicopters on board ships are also reasonably effective against immersion but have limited search ranges. They propose it to use the ASW patrol to perform initial detection while helicopters may follow, making it very difficult for a submarine to escape. This article states that the GX-6 would be suitable for marine areas in eastern and southern China and “can provide an early warning of the naval force being deployed in exercises in the Western Pacific” [可 为 海军 赴 西 太平洋 训练 提供 警戒 和保护].
The possibility of lying in China clearly in South Sea and the analysis suggests that it will allow the Chinese Navy to track foreign submarines, causing “the loss of soldiers under the sea surface, a potential sudden attack” against the Chinese Navy, it can also provide security for the SSBN ranges of the Chinese and thus play a role in “betting on rapid nuclear deterrence for the second attack [二次 核 反击 威慑 力].” According to an article that completes the design, the GX-6 “高速 生产] and the magnitude of the power will grow dramatically a “big leap” for the Chinese ASW. However, the Chinese analysis ends in a modest tone.
It is even more important, according to this article, that Chinese engineers finally solved the problem of large aircraft (P-8) and Japan P-1). A.S.W firmly wings at all.
With other emerging Chinese
capabilities, US submarines will face better-equipped competition in the
Western Pacific. Over the past decade, they have accustomed American
adventurers to working with high freedom - almost without opposition -
but now it is transforming.
This development is particularly troubling because of China’s growing ability to maintain allied air bases in the operating space, thus ensuring aviation superiority in the early stages of the conflict. As a result, it is possible that when P-8 US Navy aircraft can be a higher model of A.S.W aircraft, they cannot fly in the western Pacific sky that built with Chinese fighters. The Chinese airline A.S.W will be free to seek more protection from its quarry.
In this way, the Chinese Air Force can reduce the previously untenable advantage of America in the submarine war. One of the last points to drawn from this article is that it explicitly links this aircraft with China’s nuclear deterrent. With all of this discussion in recent years about new coral reef bases in China in the South China Sea, several strategists have discussed aspects of the nuclear strategy for these new airports in the Spratly Islands.
For myself, analysts of the skeptical true military values of these new coral bases (because of congenital weakness), I must admit that Chinese strategists might be right. If the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy uses them to launch an ASW platform like the GX-6, they can play a key role in protecting the Chinese (SSBNs) from their base in Hainan. Since the nuclear war is relatively short, al-Qaeda’s survival over the long term may not be important as long as they could support the initial out of the submarine patrols and fire stations.
If they have already built these rules to support an advanced nuclear strategy for China, it can also help explain why Beijing has linked to this masterful construction and has not yet made a move towards fulfilling the maharajah anti-interceptor. A full understanding of Beijing’s motives, including the long-ignored nuclear factor in the South China Sea, could help improve the response of Americans and their allies.
Recently the People’s Liberation Army (P.L.A) Guard community is full of the reputation that China will soon launch intruders. These are all legitimate topics for discussion, but we should not ignore the less charming items in the Beijing instrument that can have a major impact on the strategic balance.
So if American strategists were to take note when the reports on the creation of a new unit of operations free of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, the first military aircraft flying long-range naval patrols to maintain China’s Sea Progress (MPA) improved to resist the submarine war. they activated it, and the device comprises several GX-6 [高新 六号] ASW aircraft in the southern seas of the fleet during the spring of 2018.
Chinese naval analysts recognize the weakness of the PLA in the assembly and openly describe it as a “short board” of the Chinese “barrel”. The other Chinese platforms, ASW’s subsidiary, such as SH-5 or Z-9, said to be a helicopter with limited capacities, such as “the Chinese Navy was in dire need to provide them with a large ASW aircraft model with a solid wing” [中国海军 迫切 需要 装置 型 型 型 固定翼 反潜 飞机]. Given that the benefits of these aircraft, including speed and scope, a huge load, coupled with the fact that submarines are in trouble at the head of these aircraft, calls for this analysis to identify America’s air patrol aircraft as an “enemy” [天敌] submarine.
The analysis shows that the GX-6 powered by a new engine type that includes fans designed to increase efficiency. They set the operating range to 5000 kilometers.
It is said the GX-6 bears the burden of 100 sonorous. They use these to set targets. According to the Chinese analysis, the magnetometer [磁 探 仪 يكشف] can detect submarines with a depth of 900 or even 1000 meters. Whether it’s true or just a joke, looking at the image or drawing of the plane means that the magnetometer is a key part of the design.
This article also states that ASW helicopters on board ships are also reasonably effective against immersion but have limited search ranges. They propose it to use the ASW patrol to perform initial detection while helicopters may follow, making it very difficult for a submarine to escape. This article states that the GX-6 would be suitable for marine areas in eastern and southern China and “can provide an early warning of the naval force being deployed in exercises in the Western Pacific” [可 为 海军 赴 西 太平洋 训练 提供 警戒 和保护].
The possibility of lying in China clearly in South Sea and the analysis suggests that it will allow the Chinese Navy to track foreign submarines, causing “the loss of soldiers under the sea surface, a potential sudden attack” against the Chinese Navy, it can also provide security for the SSBN ranges of the Chinese and thus play a role in “betting on rapid nuclear deterrence for the second attack [二次 核 反击 威慑 力].” According to an article that completes the design, the GX-6 “高速 生产] and the magnitude of the power will grow dramatically a “big leap” for the Chinese ASW. However, the Chinese analysis ends in a modest tone.
It is even more important, according to this article, that Chinese engineers finally solved the problem of large aircraft (P-8) and Japan P-1). A.S.W firmly wings at all.
This development is particularly troubling because of China’s growing ability to maintain allied air bases in the operating space, thus ensuring aviation superiority in the early stages of the conflict. As a result, it is possible that when P-8 US Navy aircraft can be a higher model of A.S.W aircraft, they cannot fly in the western Pacific sky that built with Chinese fighters. The Chinese airline A.S.W will be free to seek more protection from its quarry.
In this way, the Chinese Air Force can reduce the previously untenable advantage of America in the submarine war. One of the last points to drawn from this article is that it explicitly links this aircraft with China’s nuclear deterrent. With all of this discussion in recent years about new coral reef bases in China in the South China Sea, several strategists have discussed aspects of the nuclear strategy for these new airports in the Spratly Islands.
For myself, analysts of the skeptical true military values of these new coral bases (because of congenital weakness), I must admit that Chinese strategists might be right. If the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy uses them to launch an ASW platform like the GX-6, they can play a key role in protecting the Chinese (SSBNs) from their base in Hainan. Since the nuclear war is relatively short, al-Qaeda’s survival over the long term may not be important as long as they could support the initial out of the submarine patrols and fire stations.
If they have already built these rules to support an advanced nuclear strategy for China, it can also help explain why Beijing has linked to this masterful construction and has not yet made a move towards fulfilling the maharajah anti-interceptor. A full understanding of Beijing’s motives, including the long-ignored nuclear factor in the South China Sea, could help improve the response of Americans and their allies.
